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Abstract: 
From 1945 to date, the state has been at the centre of debates in IR theorizing. While the anti-statist theorists had 
contested and are still contesting its centrality in IR theorizing, the unrepentant state-centric theorists even in the 
era of technological globalization still consider it, the fulcrum of IR. This paper in a discursive cum historical 
fashion, drawn mainly from secondary source, examined the nature of the debates in order to decipher its limit 
or limitlessness in comtemporary IR theorising. The paper, after a careful diagnosis of the concept of the state as 
well as undergoing the genealogical survey of state centrism in IR theorising, concludes that the state though is 
still the primary actor in IR but the empirical realities of the post WWII World have confirmed that it is no 
longer, what it used to be. Hence, it has limits in contemporary IR theorizing. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since its nurture in the classical Greek city 
state system, through its revamping in the 
Renaissance Italian city state system and its 
eventual formalization courtesy of the 
Westphalia arrangement of 1648, the state 
has been accepted as fait accompli, by 
statesmen, diplomats and scholars of 
international relations particular those with   
realist bent. Since then, it has been glorified 
to the extent that when statesmen and 
diplomats think, they think about the state 
(Palmer and Perkins 2000). Aside from its 
engravement in the hearts of statesmen and 
diplomats, the theoretical postulates of Jean 
Bodin, Hugo Grotius and Thomas Hobbes 
further strengthened the belief that with the 
state everything is possible. Although, the 
idea of omnipotency and absoluteness of the 
state as conceived by European statesmen at 
Westphalia and promoted theoretically by 
Bodin, Grotius and Hobbes was traditionally 
European, the idea of statehood soon spread 
outside the Western hemisphere (Tilly,1975, 
Hansen, 2002). 
 
Although, literature suggests that there was 
no consensus among the theorists of the 18
th
 
and 19
th
 centuries on the institutional make- 
up of the state
 
but by early 20
th
 century, 
scholars and diplomats of all shades have 
agreed that irrespective of the character of 
the modern state, it is a coercive and 
territorial entity. Max Weber quoted in 
Gerth and Mills (1972:78) developed one of 
the most significant definitions of the 
modern state, by placing emphasis upon 
three distinctive elements in history: 
territoriality, violence and legitimacy. Of 
course, Weber emphasized: ‘A state is that 
human community that successfully claims 
the monopoly of the legitimate use of 
physical force within a given territory’.   
 
The Weberian conception of the state 
became entrenched in academic and policy 
circles. In fact, not only did realists and 
liberals accept it, the notion of the territorial 
state became the focal point of analysis in 
international relations theorizing. However, 
due to the turbulence in the global system 
(Rosenau, 1990), the state paradigm came 
under challenges from other paradigms. 
First, by the communist internationalists, 
during the first  world war (Hollis and 
Smith, 1990:33) and subsequently by 
various strands of thought.  
 
During the 1950s, it became fashionable to 
speak of the demise of the state because of 
the development of nuclear technology. 
These, it was argued had exploded the 
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state’s claim to protect its population. 
According to the leading exponent of this 
view, John Herz (1959) the nation -state was 
being undermined, by four factors: its 
susceptibility to economic welfare, the rise 
of international communications and the 
consequent permeability of national 
frontiers, the development of air warfare, 
which could take war directly to state’s 
population; and nuclear weapons, which 
threatened the very survival of states and 
their population. The state was therefore, 
according to Herz, unlikely to remain the 
dominant unit of international relations for 
the future. Such view expressed by Herz re-
echoed in the positions of two leading 
realists (Carr 1946) and Morgenthau (1966). 
Morgenthau specifically argues that the 
state is a product of history and therefore 
bound to disappear in the course of history. 
He further emphasizes: 
Modern technology and in 
particular, the nuclear bomb, 
invalidated, the state as a means 
of social organization as the 
state was incapable of providing 
a means of protecting its citizen 
–its raison d’etre. 
 
If the state was becoming supplanted by 
supranational organizations as claimed by 
functionalists and neofunctionalists of the 
1950s and 1960s (Haas, 1958), what was the 
place of the state in I R theory in subsequent 
decades? In the 1970s, state – centric 
paradigm continued to be object of 
theoretical onslaught. First, by pluralists like 
Keohane and Nye (1972) who claimed that, 
there are actors other than states, which play 
a central role in international relations. 
Included in this category were multinational 
corporations and revolutionary groups. 
Second, the complex interdependence 
theorists notably Morse (1976) also 
contended that the increasing linkages 
among national economies have made them 
more than ever sensitive and vulnerable to 
events in other countries.  
 
Together, the above points suggest that the 
state in the 1970s lost its control over events 
as new forces came to play important role in 
global affairs (Brown, 1974). With the 
winding up of the cold war in the 1990s, the 
optimists who had thought that the unipolar 
order would create a semblance of unity 
among theorists were proven wrong. Indeed, 
the end of the cold war led to resurgence of 
new debates about the state, its centrality its 
utility and meaning.  
 
In relations to its meaning, contemporary 
scholars contend that the state concept is 
imprecise. As Ferguson and Mansbach 
(1989) put it “the definition of the word 
state are so numerous that they obscure all 
meaning”.  In the post – cold war global 
system driven by the logic of neoliberalism, 
as a concept and empirical substance, it 
continues to be challenged by a myriad of 
perspectives and approaches.  
 
It is against this background that this paper 
seeks to examine the nature of this debate. 
In order to set about its tasks, the paper 
proceeds in six stages. Part one, the 
introduction, attempts to lay the background 
of the study and to present the main thesis   
of  the paper. Part two that follows aims at 
clarifying the concept of the state. Part three 
examines the genealogy of the state-centric 
paradigm in IR theorising. Part four focuses 
on theoretical challenges to state-centric 
paradigm. Part five discusses and Part six 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. DEFINING THE STATE 
 
As Hosper (1967:3) once observed “things, 
events, objects are defined in order to 
identify them”. The Hosperian view 
suggests that there is a classificatory 
dimension to definitions. Although, the 
above fact may appear irrelevant to a 
discussion of such value-laden concept like 
the state but it is mentioned to illustrate the 
confusion that is raised by such concepts 
like the nation, society, community etc. that 
are often used erroneously with the concept 
of the state. The essence here is to delineate 
the concept of the state in Political Science 
and IR from other similar concepts that are 
often associated with it.  
 
Another issue that relates to the above point 
is how to make a distinction between the 
defining and accompanying characteristics  
   35 
Covenant Journal of Politics and International Affairs (CUJPIA) Vol. 1, No. 1 (Maiden Edition), September, 2013 
 
 
 
of the state because in most cases, semantic 
analysts often raise the accompanying 
characteristics to the level of defining 
characteristics so when such characteristics 
are discovered elsewhere, there is little to 
distinguish. The foregoing suggests that the 
state as a concept in IR is riddled in 
semantic imbroglio. How then do we define 
the state?  
 
The state like other key concepts in IR is in 
all indications, essentially contested 
concepts (Gallie, 1962). As a result, the 
concept of the state remains one of the most 
problematic in the field of Political Science 
and IR. Political theorists have not agreed 
on the meaning of the state and this has 
created semantic chaos (Neumann, 1964; 
Skinner, 1978).. Ferguson and Mansbach 
(op cit) put the situation thus: 
As a result of conceptual and 
semantic confusion, the state is 
said to have little substance as 
an empirical concept and 
virtual utility as an analytical 
concept, it obscures far more 
that it clarifies. 
 
Added to the definitional dilemma is the 
fact that theorists often confuse the state as 
an institution with the state as a concept 
(Fried, 1972:143). However, despite its 
imprecise nature (Palmer and Perkins, op 
cit), attempts have been made in scholarly 
literature to define it but as Held et al (1983) 
averred “four traditions have emerged in 
answering the philosophical questions: 
“what is the state?” But none according to 
them forms a unity. However, for the 
purpose of this paper, the functionalists and 
Marxists perspectives are added to the 
legalist perspectives. The first perspective 
drawing from functional sociology defines 
the state in functional terms. According to 
his perspective, the state is a neutral 
institution that balances competing interests 
among groups in the community (Goode, 
1972; Dahl, 1975).  
 
However, despite the plausibility of the 
functionalists’ position, it has been 
criticized by the Marxists who contend that 
the state is not an objective force but a 
machine not only for maintaining the rule of 
a class but for the domination of one class 
by the other (Lenin, 1977; Miliband, 1969). 
Lenin quoted in Harding (1977) averred 
thus: ‘The modern representative state is the 
instrument for the exploitation of wages 
labour by capital – ‘a special repressive 
force’ 
Therefore, for the purpose of this paper, it 
may not serve any useful purpose resolving 
the controversies but to extract a definition 
that will be analytically useful for our 
purpose. Hence, the Weberian definition 
because of it, analytical clarity offers a 
recipe. Weber (1978) claimed thus: 
The modern state unlike its 
predecessors which were 
troubled by constantly warring 
factions has a capacity of 
monopolizing the legitimate 
use of violence within a given 
territory. (emphasis added)  
 
The Weberian definitional framework 
formed the cornerstone of the post-W W II 
realist thought (Carr, 1939; Wight, 1946; 
Morgenthau, 1948). In addition, in the realm 
of international law, the basic component of 
Weberianism has been embedded. Article 1 
of the Montevideo Convention of 1933 on 
the Rights and Duties of States summarized 
the major components of statehood: A state 
must possess a permanent population; a 
well-defined territory and a government 
capable of ruling its citizens and managing 
formal diplomatic relations with other states 
(Kegley, 2007: 539). 
 
 
3. THE GENEALOGY OF THE STATE-
CENTRIC PARADIGM 
 
In the 20
th
 century, much of the thinking 
about realism in IR , had centered on the 
state.  To the realist of the 20
th
 century, the 
state was the primary actor in international 
affairs. Although state-centrism has 
generated much debates but a less noticed 
trend in the debates has been the debate 
about its genealogy. In this section of the 
paper, we intend to trace the genealogy of 
the state-centric paradigm in IR  in order to 
reconfigure the debates about state –
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centrism and the wider question of its place 
in IR theory. 
 
State centric theory has intellectual roots 
that could be traced to the ancient world. In 
his celebrated history of the Peloponnesian 
war, Thucydides quoted in Finley (1972:49) 
stated that “what made war inevitable was 
the growth of Athenian power and the fear 
that which this caused in Sparta”. Two 
issues arise from the Thucydides 
perspective above: First, power struggles in 
an anarchical setting. Second, two political 
entities engaged in war-like relationships. 
Thucydides focused his analysis not only on 
individual statesmen or the entire Greek city 
state system but rather on two identifiable 
political units: Athens and Sparta. In the late 
medieval period, the Renaissance Italian 
city states provided a laboratory for 
developing realist theory. During this 
period, Niccollo Machiavelli, drawing from 
the classical works of Thucydides, analysed 
inter- state relations in the Italian city state 
of the 16
th
 countries. Machiavelli in his 
raison d’etre clearly demarcated state 
morality from individual morality. 
 
In fact, Sabine quoted in Fried (op cit; 144) 
has argued that “the word state was fixed as 
a generic term for a body politic by 
Machiavelli early in the sixteenth country at 
which time it seems to have been current 
stato “Thomas Hobbes, having witness the 
30years war came to the conclusion that a 
strong entity or a common power was 
mandatory for maintaining order within 
political system. The common power or the 
sovereign has to have sufficient power to 
make agreement stick, to enforce contracts 
and to ensure that the laws governing 
political and economic life were upheld. 
Since in Hobbes’s view men’s ambition: 
avarice, anger and other passion are strong, 
the bonds of words are too weak to bridle 
them … without some fear of coercive 
power. As Hobbes quoted in Held etal 
(opcit) put  
“conv enant without the sword 
are but words and of no 
strength to secure a man at all. 
Beyond the sovereign state’s 
sphere of influence there will 
always be chaos of constant 
warfare but within the 
territory controlled by the 
state, with fear of some 
coercive power, social order 
can be sustained”.  
Here, it is important to stress that Hobbes 
conceptualized sovereignty in a self-
perpetuating, undivided and absolute term. 
In essence, a strong secular state was 
offered by Hobbes as the most effective, 
appropriate and legitimate political form.  
 
The foregoing indicates that Hobbes saw the 
state as an institution that protects the 
people from both internal and external 
predators. George Hegel, in the early 19
th
 
century drawing from the experience of a 
strong Prussian state, elevated the position 
of the state. Although, an idealist 
7
, he 
believed that the state’s highest duty should 
lie in its preservation. In fact, Hegel quoted 
in Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (1996:64) 
reasoned that: 
Since states are related to one 
another as autonomous entities 
and so as particular wills on 
which the validity of treaties 
depends and  since the 
particular wills of the whole is 
content a will for its own 
welfare, it follows that welfare 
is the highest aim governing 
the relation of one state to 
another (emphasis added.)   
Moreover, Hegel by reechoing Machievelli 
contended that the state has a moral 
standards different from and superior to 
those of individual. 
Among the antecedents of modern state-
centre theory is the work of Max Weber 
whose writings dealt extensively on, the 
centrality of the state in IR. Weber drawing 
from the works of Hegel constructed a 
model of a unified bureaucratic state where 
the use of force is the prerogative of the 
state. The state maintains compliance or 
order within a given territory. The state’s 
web of agencies and institutions, finds its 
ultimate sanction in the claim to the 
monopoly of coercion and a political order 
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is only vulnerable to crises when this 
monopoly erodes. 
 
Hence, argued Weber, the state is based on a 
monopoly of physical coercion which is 
legitimized (that is sustained) by a believer 
in the justifiability and or legality of this 
monopoly and since people no longer 
complied with the authority claimed by the 
powers that be merely on grounds (habit or 
charisma) rather there is general obedience 
by virtue of legality; by virtue of the belief 
in the validity of legal statutes and 
functional ‘competence’ based on rationally 
created rules. As legal entity, it has the 
capacity to enforce its power within its 
territory and to project the same into the 
international society.  
 
One issue emerges from the Weberian 
conception: the state is seen as unitary, self -
containing entity with the rationality of its 
own. This thesis has had implication for 
realist theory, for example; the post-World 
War II realist by following this proposition 
developed the rational actor perspective. In 
this perspective, the state is theorised as an 
impersonal, rational, self -calculating entity 
that rationally seeks to maximize gains and 
minimize losses. 
The above theme echoed in the realist 
account of notable realists after the Second 
World War and beyond. In the post-cold 
war world, such thinking is still prevalent in 
IR particularly in the United States. 
 
4. STATE CENTRISM AND ITS 
CRITICS  
 
Despite the seeming plausibility of the state 
centric framework, it has been decoupled 
and critics are still decoupling it. This 
section of the paper attempts to examine the 
challenges the paradigm has had to contend 
with.  Although, the paper focuses more on 
the post cold war discourses, but an attempt 
is made briefly to examine some of the 
classical critiques of state centrism. In 
essence, our evaluations of the critiques of 
the state is organized into four historical 
waves, namely the classical, the post-world 
I, post-world war II and the post-cold war. 
 
The first major challenge to state centrism 
as espoused by Thucydides, during the 
heyday of the Greek civilization, came after 
the decline of Greek power. During this 
period, Cicero and other stoics bequeathed a 
theory of cosmopolititarism i.e. citizenship 
in a world state. Cosmopolitan theory as 
developed by the stoics suggests that global 
politics of the age was not state driven but 
global driven. 
 
The second challenge to the state centric 
paradigm came from the Marxists before 
and after the first world. According to this 
view, the working classes in capitalist 
Europe had more to unite them than divide 
them and the separateness of state was a 
piece of mystification which helped to 
perpetuate capitalism..  
The post-world war II challenge to state 
centric came in three waves. In the 1950s, 
the hard shell thesis that has characterized 
the realist thinking was shattered by the 
views expressed by the exponents of hard 
shell permeability perspectives, (Herz, 
opcit). As earlier expressed in the 
introductory background, the period also 
witnessed theoretical somersault of notable 
realists. The second waves also in the 1950s 
was the challenge posed to state centric 
paradigm by the integrationist who 
contended that since Europe was in the era 
of supranationlity, the era of the nation state 
would still be over.(Haas, op cit; Mitrany op 
cit) 
The third waves of the 1970s as briefly 
presented earlier in this paper was 
characterized by the theoretical activities of 
transnationalists who claimed that 
increasing interdependence of the global 
economy has reduced the power of the 
Mercantilist state (Mc Michael, 2000). Our 
examination of the development of the 1970 
will be incomplete without looking at the 
Neorealist moment.  
 
Although, Neorealism was partly a response 
to the claims of transnationalists, as its name 
suggests. The key text in literature during 
the late 1970s was Kenneth Waltz’s Theory 
of the International Politics. By rejecting  
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Morgenthau’s state centrism as being 
reductionist, he proposed an 
uncompromising system account. He 
contended that Morgenthau and all the 
systems theorists
9
 were not truly basing 
their account on systems but rather on the 
capabilities of the units comprising the 
system. As he put it “There is no appeal to 
the intentions or capabilities of states 
(Waltz, 1979) 
 
However, despite the logic of realist 
thinking the cold war did not end in a 
nuclear Armageddon. Instead, it passed 
away peacefully. A series of momentous 
changes in the international landscape saw 
to that. The Soviet’s military withdrawal 
from Afghanistan, the collapse of the Soviet 
empire in Eastern Europe, the unification of 
Germany, the demise of the Warsaw pact 
and the disintegration of the Soviet Union 
signaled the end of the bi-polar world 
(Patman, 2006:8). In fact, Soviet leader, 
Mikhail Gorbachev, openly declared in his 
address to the UN General Assembly in 
1988 thus: 
Thanks to the advances in mass 
media and means of 
transportation, the world seems 
to have become more visible 
and tangible. International 
communication has become 
easier than ever before. Today, 
the preservation of any kind of 
closed society is hardly 
possible. This calls for a 
radically review of approaches 
to the totality of the problems of 
international co-operation as a 
major element of universal 
security (Gorbachev, 1988). 
 
The foregoing suggests that the late 1980s 
and early 1990s witnessed fundamental 
transformation of the global system. These 
changes had serious implications not only 
for the international system but also for unit 
actors that compose it (Basiru, 2009). The 
end of cold war may have been celebrated 
by optimists (Fukuyama, 1989) but the 
skeptics exercised caution. 
The neoliberal agenda under the guise of 
globalisation became the first major 
challenge to state centrism after the cold 
war. As Ohmae (1995) put it “state had 
become “dinosaur” waiting to die”. While 
the hyperglobalists contend that 
globalisation has eliminated the space for 
states to manage national affairs (Guehenno, 
1995), the skeptics contend that the impact 
of globalization on sovereign state is much 
exaggerated. The state according to them is 
still the sole institution tasked with the 
responsibility for establishing the 
precondition for governance and security 
(Robertson, 1992). Whether globalization 
undermines the state or not, some pluralists 
contend that states have been transformed. 
In fact, Brown (1995: 253) remarked thus: 
The state-centric system is now 
being transformed into a global 
Polyarchy in which national-
states, subnational groups and 
transnational interests and 
communities are lying for the 
support and loyalty of 
individuals and (in which) 
conflicts are prosecuted and 
resolved on the basis of ad hoc 
power plays and bargaining 
among shifting combinations of 
these groups. The institutions 
with the greatest coercive 
capabilities- national 
governments- are losing a good 
deal of their legitimate 
authority. 
 In the   polyarchic system, foisted on the 
international system by technological 
globalization, states  according to Rosenau 
(2006:36)  are affected by both localising 
and globalising forces or “fragmegration” 
Outer forces are emanating from 
international organizations (regional and 
global), a growing awareness of 
interdependence and calls for integration 
and co-operation to deal with vital issue that 
affect nations and the revolution in 
information technology (Dougherty and 
Pfatzgraff, Op cit) . Also, various forces are 
making for the polarization, secession and  
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balkanization from within existing states 
(Levine, 1996; Barber, 1992) . Rosenau (Op 
cit), in his own contribution to the debate 
invented the concept of complexity by 
arguing that the transformation affecting the 
global system and its units could not be 
explained by one factor. Hence, by 
disagreeing with Gamble (1995), he 
submitted thus:  
Being complex, the new 
conditions that evolved in 
recent decades cannot be 
explained by a single source. 
Technological dynamics are 
major stimulants, but is the 
breakdown of trust, the 
shrinking of distances, the 
globalisation of economies, and 
the explosive proliferation of 
organizations, the information 
revolution, the fragmentation of 
groups and the integration of 
regions, the surge of 
democratic practices and the 
spread of fundamentalism, the 
cessation of intense enmities 
and the revival of historic 
animosities -all of which in turn 
provide further reactions that 
add to the complexity.  
He asserts further that information 
revolution has quickened the interaction of 
the localising and globalising dynamics. As 
he put it “a wide range of technology has 
quickened the pace at which people and 
collectivities interact and thereby 
heightening fragmegration dynamics”. 
Hence, he seeks to identity the sources of 
fragmegration in the global system: the 
micro parameter, macro-micro parameter 
and the macro parameter.  
 
All these parameter contended, Rosenau, 
had implication for the state in the 
contemporary global system. The micro 
parameter which could be discerned in skill 
revolution has shaped and is shaping the 
contour of world politics. As the publics 
become more aware of the changes around 
them, they tend to take active part in 
shaping politics of their countries. As 
Rosenau puts it “is no accident that the 
squares of the world cities have largely 
been filled with large crowds demanding 
change”. The micro parameter has larger 
implication as it redefines the authority 
structure of the state.  
 
In the contemporary times stated Rosenau, 
the sources of authority have shifted from 
traditional to performance criteria of 
legitimacy. The more the performance is 
considered appropriate-in terms of 
satisfying people needs-the more they are 
likely to co-operate and comply. The less 
they approve the performance record, the 
more they are likely to withhold their 
compliance or otherwise complicate the 
efforts of the state. As a consequence of the 
pervasive authority crises, states have 
become less effective in confronting 
challenges and implementing policies. The 
relocation of authority precipitated by the 
structural crises of states occurs in several 
directions. In many instances, it involves, 
inward’ relocation towards sub national 
groups, ethnic minorities, local 
governments, single- issue organizations, 
religious and linguistic groupings, political 
factions, trade unions etc.  
 
At another level, claimed Rosenau, it 
involves relocating authority to collectivities 
that transcend national boundaries. In 
deciphering the macro parameter, he argued 
that unlike before the traditional macro 
collectivity (the state) is not  no longer  
predominant. Due to skill revolution, the 
world wide spread of authority crises and 
the many other dynamics of fragmegration, 
the state has under gone bifurcation. He puts 
the situation thus: 
A complex multi- centric world 
of diverse, relatively 
autonomous actors has 
emerged, replete with 
structures, processes and 
decision rules of its own. The 
sovereign- free actors of the of 
the multi-centric world consist 
of multinational corporations, 
ethnic minorities, subnational 
governments and 
bureaucracies, professional 
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societies, political parties, 
transnational organizations and 
the likes. Individually and 
sometimes jointly, they 
compete, conflict, co-operate or 
otherwise interact with the 
sovereign- bound actors of the 
state-centric world. 
 
The frameworks constructed by Rosenau 
suggest that the state-centric paradigm has 
been called to question. In the post-cold war 
world, the state centric paradigm was also 
challenge by new thinking in international 
law and diplomacy. The neoliberal 
institutionalists argue that new rules of 
international society have emerged to 
restrict the power of the state in the 
contemporary world. International law has 
recently begun to fundamentally revise its 
traditional prohibition against military 
intervention in the wake of recent wave of 
terrorism by state against their own people.  
 
For humanitarian purposes, the belief that 
the state has the right even obligation to 
intervene in the affairs of other states has 
won advocates (Fennimore, 2003). In the 
post- cold war world, international law has 
defined military intervention as a right and 
duty to alleviate human suffering, stop 
genocide and ethnic cleaning and prevent 
the repression by state of basic human rights 
(Feinstein and Slaughter, 2004). As smith 
(2000) quoted in Kegley (op cit) put it: 
The last 50 years have seen the 
rise of universal endorsed 
principles of conduct defining 
human right by punishing acts 
of genocide and by 
interpreting intervention as a 
spectrum of possible action 
ranging from mild diplomatic 
protest to military invasion, 
even occupation. 
 
The result of all this developments 
according to theorists of this genre has been 
the collapse of the Westphalia principle that 
what a state does within its boundaries was 
its own business. 
 
 
 
5. DISCUSSIONS 
Attempt were made in the preceding 
sections to present the various theoretical 
challenges to the state particularly after the 
cold war but there is no agreement on which 
is the most powerful theoretically. One 
question logically flows from the last point: 
is the state still the state
 
.In turn other 
questions arise: Is the world still state-
centric or multi-centric? Has globalisation 
not altered the integrity of the state? Has 
fragmegrative dynamics not played out in 
virtually every state of the world? Has a 
new international legal regime not 
constrained the choices available to state? 
etc. 
 
This part attempts in evidential fashion to 
offer answers to these questions. In the first 
place, good insights into the sometimes-
conflict-sometimes cooperate interactions of 
the state- centric and multi-centric world are 
readily available when the United Nations 
summit meeting on one or other issues of 
high on the global agenda and the multi-
centric organise simultaneous deliberation 
on the same issues in or around the same 
city. Rio de Janeiro meeting on the 
environment in 1992, the Vienna meeting 
on human rights in 1993 and the Beijing 
meeting on the right of women in 1995 are 
illustrative in this regard. Indeed such 
parallel conferences have become 
institutionalized and serve as main channel 
through which the two worlds interact 
(Rosenau, opcit ) 
 
In another instance, empirical reality 
suggests that globalization has indeed 
weakened the integrity of many states in 
Africa, Asia, Pacific and Latin America. To 
be more specific, the adoption of 
globalisation oriented reforms by African 
states has forced many of them to transfer 
development responsibilities to the 
development partner. The NEPAD agenda is 
illustrative is in this case. To argue that 
fragmegrative dynamics is restricted in 
scope is to do a disservice to truth. 
Pervasive authority crises have affected 
states both in the global north and in south. 
The issues at stake in Quebec-Canada or 
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Basque- Spain are not different from those 
of Darfur-Sudan or Ijaw- Nigeria (Gurr, 
2000). 
 
Finally, the myth that states have the right to 
do whatever they like within their territories 
have been shattered under new a legal 
doctrine: the responsibility to protect. This 
doctrine has seen invoked to justify 
intervention and invasions in tyrannical 
states. NATO in Kosovo (1999) and United 
States led invasion of Iraq (2003) are 
illustrative of this trend.  
 
6. CONCLUSION. 
 
This paper set for itself one goal: to dissect 
the limit of the state in contemporary IR 
theory and in order to achieve this goal, the 
paper traced the main phases in the history 
of state centric paradigm and at the same 
time identifying the various theoretical 
challenges to state –centrism. Also, various 
evidential illustrations suggest that 
sovereignty, territoriality and legitimacy 
which were considered as the hallmark of 
the state are fast disappearing.  
 
More so, the global reality of the 21
st
 
century indicates that the world is now 
multi-centric rather than state-centric. The 
state is no longer, what it used to be. The 
last point suggests that state centric 
approach cannot be solely deployed when 
constructing theories in IR because of its 
limited utility. Hence, theory building in the 
contemporary period should focus on multi 
centric approach rather than state centric 
approach. 
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